The ignominious failure of Misuari to effectively wield governmental powers to attain Muslims' quest for lasting peace and sustained development led to his ouster not only as ARMM governor and SPCPD chairman but also as MNLF chairman. Misuari's expulsion from government was followed by his incarceration and is currently facing trial for charges of sedition4 and corruption. 5 The MNLF, the revolutionary organization that Misuari led for thirty years both in war and peace, is now under a new leadership. Led by the "Council of 15",6 it "retired" Misuari and rendered him powerless by euphemistically naming him as "Chairman Emeritus". Through a resolution it issued on 29 April 2001, Misuari was declared as "incompetent" to remain as MNLF's chairman. The Council later proclaimed itself as the legitimate Central Committee of the MNLF7 which was eventually recognized both by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Philippine government. Support for the new MNLF leadership was reiterated in the OIC 10th summit meeting held in Putrajaya, Malaysia, on 15 October 2003, claiming it to be the sole "representative of Muslim community in the Philippines". 8 Despite OIC's and the government's acknowledgement of MNLF and the ARMM as the Muslims' organizational expression and spokesperson in the Philippines, they nevertheless recognize that the Muslims' quest for political autonomy and self-governance has not been fully satisfied. The ARMM, even under the new breed of MNLF leadership, has yet to realize its mandated goals not only in alleviating Muslim socio-economic conditions but also in securing, preserving, and protecting the integrity of their identity, culture, and religion.
Moreover, the uncertainty and nebulousness of the autonomy package offered by the government failed to fully extinguish the cause of Muslim secessionist movement in the Philippines. Although the MNLF had relinquished its armed separatist struggle since the year 19769 before finally deciding to be part of the government in 1996, the Muslim independence movement has continued; this time, spearheaded by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) .
The MILF, a breakaway faction of the MNLF in 197710 chaired by Salamat Hashim until his death on 13 July 2003, had been sidelined by the Philippine government from the 1996 peace talks. Faced with legal and technical constraints to forge a separate peace agreement with the MILF, the government had no other recourse but to conclude the GRP-MNLF FPA before embarking on a new round of peace talks with the former.11 Similarly, the MILF adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude while the GRP-MNLF talks were in progress.12 Hence, the GRP-MILF peace process only began in 1997 though informal peace overtures started a year earlier.
As a party outside of the GRP-MNLF peace process, the MILF was able to focus its efforts in expanding and consolidating its military strength while awaiting the results of the FPA. In what seemed to be a minuscule armed-force when it severed from MNLF, the MILF has grown from 5,000 fighters (with some 3,000 firearms) in early 1980s to 15,000 fighters (with more than 11,000 firearms) by the end of 1999. 13 A U.S. intelligence report estimates a stronger force, with 35,000 to 40,000 armed full-time guerrillas,14 while the MILF claims that its armed force (Bangsa Moro Islamic Armed Forces or BIAF) has about 120,000 fighters (80 per cent are armed) and 300,000 militiamen in the late 1990s.15 Even though the Philippine military (Armed Forces of the Philippines or AFP) puts the MILF strength to be much less than what it claims -between 8,000 and 15,000 operating mainly in the provinces of Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, and North Cotabato -the government does not deny that rebels' ranks swelled by 14 per cent in the first six months of 1999 and 1 1 per cent in terms of firearms in the same period. Apart from its military strength, the MILF was able to establish forty-six camps or "community bases", also known as "MILF territories" (thirteen major and thirty-three satellite camps) in thirteen out of fifteen provinces of Mindanao and SuIu archipelago.
The country has yet to cherish the fruits of the GRP-MNLF peace agreement when then President Fidel Ramos embarked on another round of exploratory talks with the MILE Although formal peace negotiations between the GRP and the MILF had started with the signing of the GRP-MILF Agreement for the General Cessation of Hostilities (AGCH) on 18JuIy 1997, the end of Ramos' term and the assumption of President Joseph Estrada to power in June 1998 failed to yield any substantial results. In fact, armed hostilities between government and MILF forces intensified under Estrada's "all-out war" policy against the MILF in April 2000 that completely disregarded the 1998 General Framework of the Agreement of Intent (GFAI)16 between the GRP and MILF peace panels inked under his own administration.
Six years after the signing of the AGCH, and now under President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the GRP-MILF negotiations, though resumed in 2001 through the signing of the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, have yet to be concluded. Generally, the peace talks have been highly volatile, tenuous, insubstantial, limited to ceasefire agreements (oftentimes breached rather than respected), and presently run longer than the 1992-96 GRP-MNLF talks.
Against such a backdrop, this article intends to analyse the dynamics of the ongoing GRP-MILF peace talks in relation to the interest of the state to safeguard and protect its territorial integrity on the one hand, and the continuing quest of Muslims for "self-determination", on the other hand. ancestral domain,17 the second and third rounds plainly centred on implementing guidelines on ceasefire agreements. 18 The fourth round of talks produced two agreements. One was in the form of a joint communiqué that provides an "ad hocjoint action group" of GRP and MILF forces to isolate and interdict "criminal syndicates and kidnap-for-ransom groups including so-called 'Lost Commands' operating in Mindanao". The second was an agreement on "Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001". However, the agreements, signed respectively on 6 and 7 May 2002 in Cyberjaya and Putrajaya, both in Malaysia, became controversial as they were done through back-channel negotiations -without the knowledge of GRP's negotiating panel. The President's Adviser on Special Concerns, Norberto Gonzales, signed the documents on behalf of the GRP rather than the official negotiating panel's chief, Jesus Dureza. President Arroyo, nonetheless, defended the process and upheld the validity of the agreements as "confidence-building measures" that will prepare both parties for more comprehensive peace talks in the future. Muslims and has given a religious colour to the war that is fuelled by poverty and injustice. The fighting, which lasted nearly a week, came after Manila accused the MILF of harbouring members of the so-called "Pentagon Gang", a kidnap-for-ransom gang. The campaign was purportedly to go after the gang but government officials subsequently said diat then MILF chair Salamat Hashim was the real target.
While Arroyo ordered a ceasefire in deference to the Islamic holiday, she instructed that offensives be resumed the next day, 12 February. Jesus Dureza, head of the government negotiating panel, tried to convene the ceasefire committee in Cotabato province but the MILF did not respond. "It was useless to convene the committee", Al Haj Murad, MILF vice-chairman for military affairs (now chairman of MILF) said "because there were no guarantees that the military would stop its assault". Retaliatory attacks by MILF rebels triggered a return to full-scale fighting. Though the military eventually overran Buliok complex, MILF forces had scattered into the jungles and villages. Guerrilla attacks and ambushes against military positions and vehicles suggest the group is by no means ready to pull out of the area.
Moreover, the MILF was blamed for the attacks against civilian communities and the bombing of civilian targets, particularly the Davao International Airport and in Kabacan market-place in North Cotabato a week after the military attack against Buliok. Both attacks were officially denied by the MILF The civilian casualties pointed to the brutal and ugly resumption of another "all-out war" between the GRP and the MILF, reminiscent of the Estrada administration.
In the renewed attempt to bring the peace process back on track and rebuild the confidence shattered by the February conflict, exploratory talks were held on 27 and 28 March 2003 in Kuala Lumpur between the GRP and MILF panels. The agreement came in the form of aJoint Statement that provides among others, the following:
• Reaffirmation of commitment to achieve a comprehensive, just, and lasting political settlement on the conflict in Mindanao and resolve to undertake appropriate steps to pave the way for the resumption of formal GRP-MILF peace negotiations; • Effective implementation on the ground of all past and existing GRP-MILF agreements;
• Exercise mutual restraint to minimize, if not put an end to, violence in The ink on the signed agreement had not dried when violence resurfaced, exacting a heavy toll on civilians. Davao City (a key city in Mindanao predominated by Christians) was bombed twice, killing close to forty people. Relying on military intelligence reports, some local government officials saw the bombing as MILF's reprisal for the military's continued occupation of Buliok. The second time around, hours after the bombing of the Davao wharf in early April, armed groups hurled grenades at three mosques that victimized civilians, an obvious retaliatory attack against Muslims. Perpetrators were obviously instigating a religious conflict.
Arroyo suspended the talks in May after a series of bombings and raids on civilians that claimed hundreds of lives and displaced hundreds of thousands in Mindanao in March and April. The government blamed the separatists for the carnage and civilian casualties, and accused the MILF as a "terrorist group" or giving refuge to "terrorists". Criminal charges in a Philippine court were later filed against MILF leaders. The rebels have consistently denied perpetrating the bombings and assaults on civilians, saying a "third force" (referring to hawkish officials in the military) was muddling the peace process.
The MILF unilaterally declared a ten-day ceasefire in late May and extended it by another ten days on 12 June. Arroyo, however, rejected the "ceasefire by instalment", urging the rebels to agree to a "permanent ceasefire" and to sign a final peace pact with the government. Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Eduardo Ermita (now Secretary of the Department of National Defence) admitted the talks were back to "square one". 22 The pandemonium of violence reigned in southern Mindanao despite the commitment of protagonists to collectively seek a peaceful solution to the conflict.
Through informal meetings held in Kuala Lumpur, the GRP and MILF panels agreed on a "mutual cessation of hostilities" starting on 19 July. Owing to Malaysia's intercession which had been brokering the peace talks since 2001, Arroyo ordered the AFP to downgrade its action "from punitive operations to active defence" against the MILF. Furthermore, she instructed the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) to "lift the corresponding rewards for the arrest or capture" of MILF officials and directed the To date, formal peace talks have not begun since the conclusion of the September agreement. One overarching issue that continues to hobble the resumption of the negotiations is MILF's concern regarding the military's redeployment (read: withdrawal) of troops in Buliok complex. The government maintains that there had been a one-third decrease of troops in the area and the remaining soldiers have been engaged in civic works (building of core shelters, school buildings, and other such works) rather than in combat duties, with the nearest military detachment situated at about 200 metres from the Islamic Centre.24 Nevertheless, the MILF has consistently insisted on the complete withdrawal of AFP forces before it sits down to any scheduled peace talks. Mohaqher Iqbal, MILF's Information chief, says that "There would be no formal talks if government cannot honour its commitments", citing the September agreement.25 Likewise, Michael Mastura, one of MILF's negotiators, declared that "formal peace negotiations would have to wait until after the government fulfilled some previous commitments". 26 While the government has signified its interest to discuss MILF's precondition prior to a new round of formal talks, it seems unlikely that a total military pull-out from Buliok (MILF's former base camp) will occur in the near future. Furthermore, the delayed deployment of the Third-Party Monitoring
Team (tasked to assess the situation on the ground in terms of compliance of both parties with previously agreed to security arrangements) in the Philip-pines has affected the early discussion of the more substantive issues in the GRP-MILF talks. The Team's reported arrival on the second week of January 2004, a month before the start of the campaign for the 2004 presidential and congressional elections, showed the difficulty and uncertainty of completing a respectable GRP-MILF Final Peace Agreement in the coming year. Although a peace agreement between the GRP and MILF will not guarantee the cessation of hostilities or an assurance of lasting peace, it can momentarily provide a breathing space and create an amiable environment where stakeholders can collectively prepare the groundwork and eventually lay the structural foundations for an enduring peace and development.
The State and the Bangsamoro27 National Question Notwithstanding the ideological differences of the MNLF and MILF -the former as more secular while the latter being more Islamic -they see themselves as "one people" bound collectively on the basis of a common ancestry, history, society, institutions, territory, and more importantly, religion. As the minority people in a predominantly Christian nation, they perceive themselves as the marginalized, persecuted, and powerless people both politically and economically. Regardless of organizational affiliation, independence remains the underlying essence of political autonomy for Muslim socio-politico movements.
Given a common conception of identity, purpose, and future, they feel the need to separate themselves from those against whom they have been judged unfavourably and who reduced them to a state of poverty and underdevelopment; and subjected them to injustice and prejudice. Thus, they must proclaim themselves as "a new people", a Bangsamoro. The consciousness of being one people distinct from the neighbouring peoples, the Filipinos, is articulated and self-ascribed. They have renounced their identity as MuslimFilipino and declared themselves "Moro", which denotes the descendant of "unsubjugated" and "uncolonized" peoples; and claimed their homeland as the Bangsa Moro that has been "unjustifiably annexed by the Philippine state". What appeared to be the state's continuing prejudices against the Muslims had found Islamic expression through the MILF, rather than secular as in the case The ideals of MILF did not die with Hashim. His successor, Al Haj Murad, delivered a message on the occasion of the fasting month of Ramadan in November, in which he expressed that "there can be no genuine peace and development unless the right of the Bangsamoro people to self-determination is adequately addressed".31 The right to "self-determination" is nothing less than an assertion of political independence from the Philippine state.
While the MILF is currently engaged in peace negotiations as the only "peaceful, civilized, and democratic way of solving the Bangsamoro problem",52
it repeatedly emphasizes that independence is the main agenda and framework for the formal talks. "There is no point to proceed if the negotiations will not lead to independence", declared the MILF negotiators. The sustained effort towards gathering popular support for a U.N.-and OIC-supervised ref-
erendum, following the East Timor's (now Timor-Leste) case, is a move to achieve independence using the institution and process of democracy. For the MILF, the conduct of a referendum is one of the options or mechanisms that it can utilize outside of the peace talks. It is the exercise of the "plebiscitary right to secede". 33 On the part of the Philippine government, the defence and preservation of its territorial integrity at all costs remains its primordial interest. Gaining the support of the OIC, the United Nations, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Philippines has maintained that attempts that will transfigure the country's political structure and geographical jurisdiction will have to be done within the constitutional framework and processes of the country. Hence, MILF's ultimate agenda to secede, as what the MNLF began in 1971, is a non-negotiable issue in the GRP-MILF peace talks. MILF's attempt to cut a replica out of the East Timor experience is fraught with difficulties. Among the key concerns are the following: One, the limited international support for secession. The OIC, United Nations, and even ASEAN maintain their support for the Philippines' sovereign right to uphold the sanctity of its territorial boundaries. Further, they endorse that substantive political autonomy under the Philippines' constitution could answer the Bangsamoro legitimate problems. Notably, some pressures are applied on the MILF, especially by the OIC, which has sustained the Moro cause through the years, to agree on the negotiated settlement with the GRP. President Muammar AlQadhafi of Libya, on the occasion of the opening of the GRP-MILF first round of formal talks on 20 June 2001 in Tripoli, said that Muslims in the Philippines "can achieve peace and development only within the framework of the Republic of the Philippines and its constitutional guarantee of justice, equality and mutual respect, of tolerance, of freedom from oppression, and freedom from discrimination". 34 Second, MILF's inability to gain official recognition from the OIC as the sole representative of Muslims in the Philippines in the 2003 OIC summit meeting in Malaysia seems to augur badly for its acceptability. The OIC has continued to acknowledge the MNLF, whose leaders are now key officials of the ARMM. And third, the ability of the GRP to project the MILF as a terrorist organization or haven for terrorist elements, though vehemently and repeatedly denied by the latter, has stained the revolutionary image of the MILF.
The weak position of the MILF to negotiate with the GRP on the "selfdetermination" agenda does not mean that the concept of a Bangsa Moro is entirely flawed or problematic. Nor should the government ignore the causes of Bangsamoro rebellion. The demonstrated capacity of the MILF to mobilize a huge armed force is better seen as the key symptom of the Philippine government's predicament in respect to its Muslim minority.
The Muslim separatist movement in the Philippines is fundamentally rooted in the following causes, among others: One is the low degree of political autonomy which would enable Muslims to protect, safeguard, and defend their culture, identity, language, ways-of-life, and religion. Meaningful political autonomy becomes imperative to improve the quality of opportunity as well as individual autonomy of the members of the Muslim minorities. Second is the inability of the state to adequately meet the basic socio-economic needs of the Muslim community. And third is the belief (founded or unfounded) of Muslims that they suffer from systematic discrimination or exploitation orchestrated by the state.
Under the unitary governmental structure, the so-called "autonomy" enjoyed by the ARMM has been historically an illusion. Devolution of powers manifests itself in the formal powers or administrative arrangements that are purportedly decentralized but politically controlled or influenced by the central government. In spite of the pronouncement that the government promotes "unity through diversity", policies have been centrally formulated and conceived with less regard to the heterogeneous requirements, needs, and demands of local communities especially the minority peoples. The unitary system gives the central government the political legitimacy to rule over minorities and other indigenous communities who do not feel they are part of the nation-statein terms of culture, identity, and religion.
The failures of the ARMM and previous "autonomous regions" created in 1977 to empower and uplift the living conditions of the Muslims have made the MILF less optimistic. Arroyo's proposal for a more "enhanced, expanded, and strengthened autonomy" under the draft GRP-MILF Final Peace Agreement was shrugged off. It is a "tired phrase", states Michael Mastura, one of the members of the MILF negotiating panel.35 Aquilino Pimentel, a senator from Mindanao says that the "proposed peace pact tries to deal with the effects, not the causes, of the war in Mindanao".36 He then suggests a federal structure of government to address the problem of the Bangsamoro rebellion and bring a lasting peace in Mindanao.
The centralizing power of the state also failed to uplift the socio-economic and health conditions of the Muslims. After more than a quarter-of-a-century of Philippine government claims to be "developing" Muslim Mindanao, recent national statistics illustrate the sad reality. In virtually all measures of physical and economic well-being, the ARMM is found at or near the bottom of the national rankings.37 In government-supplied services ranging from access to pre-natal care to availability of college scholarships for low-income students, the ARMM ranks last while it registers the highest in terms of poverty incidence at 57 per cent.38
The socio-economic conditions certainly continue to worsen as population increase naturally exerts more pressures on the capacity of traditional sources of the inadequate local technologies and crafts. As with separatist movements elsewhere, ordinary Philippine Muslims are most likely to fight for or support an armed separatist organization when they are faced with no alternative means to survive the continuing discrimination and qualitatively improve their living conditions.
Finally, beyond economic and political grievances, the issue of separatism is one of subjective feelings, of perceptions, and of language -that Muslim minorities are being summarily discriminated and exploited by the Christian majorities. The dominant Christian community has not really obliterated the lingering anti-Muslim bias in their consciousness. The pre-conceived mutual feeling of bigotry and prejudice of Christians and Muslims has oftentimes led to conflict. And when conflicts escalate, perceptions and discourse are distorted within the warring parties. The distortions are partly spontaneous and partly organized to rally the people to engage in warfare, bear the economic burdens, and face the human misery of war. Conceivably, when war breaks out, truth is its first victim.
Given the aforesaid causes of the Bangsamoro secessionist movement, uncertainties remain whether the GRP-MILF talks can satisfactorily address these concerns. Inasmuch as the negotiations have not touched on the substantive issues of the conflict, nothing is definite at this point.
Nevertheless, in an effort to pursue the "self-determination" agenda in the talks, the MILF pushes the issue of ancestral domain. It hopes that government's recognition of the right of the Bangsamoro over their ancestral domain will eventually result in the acknowledgement of Moros' territory. "We just want a physical space where we can freely practise our religion and apply our ways-of-life. There is no need to seize power", says MILF information chief, Mohagher Iqbal. 39 The subject of ancestral domain will be the main agenda in the next round of discussion in 2004 between the two panels. This would likely be a thorny issue and could lead to another stalemate. For instance, the government perceives the question of ancestral domain within the bounds of the 1997 law -the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA). The IPRA seeks to recognize, protect, and promote the right of indigenous peoples and cultural communities including Muslims, to claim ownership over their ancestral domain pursuant to the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, the MILF works within the notion that the right over their ancestral domain is none other than the right to their homeland -the Bangsamoro territory; believed to have been "illegally annexed by the state". It is not only about claims and rights to obtain ancestral domain titles.
Therefore, the ancestral domain rights contemplated in the IPRA are hinged on the indigenous peoples' rights as "stewards" of the earth concept rather than on the right to self-determination and a correction of historical injustices.
The law, further, does not depart from the Regalian Doctrine as enshrined in the 216Rizal G. Buendia 1987 Constitution. 40 Nor does it divest the state of the power to determine the use of land as provided for in Section 7-c: "No Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) will be relocated without their free and prior informed consent, nor through any means other than eminent domain". By asserting its inherent power of eminent domain, the state in effect reserves its right to have the last word on ancestral domains.
The MILF regards ancestral domain as the issue, which could give substance to the self-determination struggle but the government considers it a question that can be answered within bounds of the state's power and authority. The differences of framework in viewing the issue of ancestral domain could be a tough concern in the upcoming negotiations but not necessarily insurmountable.
The Bangsamoro struggle for self-determination may persist as long as the state is able to conjure up a more democratic system of governance where minorities can freely govern themselves and chart their future with less intervention from the state. Evidently, independence movements may not necessarily be violent if the avenues for dialogues and negotiations remain open.
Conclusion: Prospect, Lessons, and Issues
The GRP-MILF peace talks in 2003 have not been too fruitful. Negotiations have been entirely focused on making ceasefire agreements more respectable and implementable as these have oftentimes been breached rather than applied. In the early part of 2004 there will be another attempt, with the participation of the OIC, to determine whether the conditions of peace are enough and institutions as well as processes in place for the GRP and MILF panels to commence the discussion on the more substantive issues behind the twenty-six years of MILF secessionist struggle.
However, in view of the May 2004 presidential elections the possibility of politicizing the GRP-MILF peace process is not far-fetched. In case a new president assumes power in June 2004, in the likes of Fernando Poe, Jr., another popular movie actor41 (aside from former President Estrada) who possesses virtually no experience in public administration and whose knowledge of the Moro conflict in Mindanao is practically nil, the peace talks might be imperilled. Thus, the future of the GRP-MILF peace negotiations will practically be contingent on the leadership of the next Philippine president, mandated to rule until 2010 (unless shortened by another "People Power Uprising").
Although the GRP-MILF peace talks have not been so encouraging for the past year, the peace process provided an enriching experience not only in the better understanding of the conflict but more importantly, in appreciating the deeper issues that continue to haunt the government and the Moro movement for decades. Some of the lessons and issues that emerged from the process but have yet to be resolved are:
One, the series of peace agreements indicates the commitment of the government and the MILF to settle their political differences through the processes and mechanisms of peace. Their engagement in the peace process gives both parties the chance to discuss and settle debatable questions in a more creative and non-violent manner. Obviously, the exchange of ideas and arguments is better than exchange of bullets and bombs.
Second, if the experience of the past thirty-two years of armed conflict in Muslim Mindanao teaches anything, it is that the use of military strength to suppress a rebellion with a legitimate cause does not necessarily extinguish it. It simply escalates the war. The "get tough" policy will have the opposite of its intended effect. It will energize the MILF and increase its popular support while undermining what is left of the 1996 Peace Agreement.
Given the current political situation in the Philippines, it is doubtful that the anxieties of the Moros would be allayed. The preponderance of state power and indiscriminate use of force, victimizing non-combatants, are clearly behind the increase in violence. Human rights violations have escalated.
Third, the present law on Muslim autonomy has not been adequate to solve the problem it aims to address. Any future offers of autonomy to Muslim Mindanao have to give the Moros greater sense of economic, cultural, and political justice. It is equally important that perceptions of discrimination, separateness, prejudice, and bigotry be expunged from the minds and hearts of the Moros. The process of reversing outlooks and feelings of alienation demands a strategic approach of sustained and effective delivery of the package of public goods and services that would bring the government closer to the people.
Fourth, the Bangsamoro national question remains a threatening issue unless confronted squarely by the government by answering the legitimate causes of rebellion. Conflicts have underlying socio-cultural, economic, and political reasons. It is almost certain that conflict breaks out if the state's response to separatism induces widespread suffering in the country or among other marginalized ethnic groups rather than alleviate the peoples' miseries through socio-economic measures. Making more people feel that the state is not their state will eventually provide separatism with new recruits. In the final analysis, it is essential that Moros be drawn within the domain of the state. Muslim minorities have to be convinced that the state really belongs to them, as well as to the Christian majority. If the state takes care of the people, the people will take care of the state.
And finally, secessionism can be dealt with more effectively through the processes, mechanisms, and institutions of peace. Despite the arduous process of peace-making as evidenced by the GRP-MILF peace talks, it remains the only sensible means. Secessionism can be resolved successfully only through patient and painstaking confidence-building measures and frequent dialogues that deal with the core problems mutually identified by contending parties. Definitely, there are no quick fixes, no short-cuts. Wounds that have festered for a long time cannot heal overnight. Nor can confidence be built or dialogue developed while fresh wounds are being inflicted. It is a process that requires special efforts to uphold human rights, fundamentally the right to development.
Secessionism is not merely a security problem of the state or of the region. Essentially, it is a political problem and requires a political solution. Hence, there is a need to lay emphasis on good governance, on the rule of law, on improved civil-military relations and on accountability for corruption and violations of human rights. These efforts would, to a large extent, facilitate the early conclusion of conflict, accelerate die process of peace, and find a respectable and honourable final peace agreement between the GRP and MILF The courage in seeking to come to terms with the past is an essential part of the search for a new way forward.
However, given the vicissitudes of Philippine politics that tend to politicize the peace process, concluding a respectable and honourable GRP-MILF peace agreement in the near future remains elusive. And whenever there is a prolonged uncertainty on the future of a sealed peace agreement, fear creeps in -fear not only for the future of the negotiations but also for the future of the people. 
